Children Watching Television Advertising: What\u27s Wrong with This Picture by Hallifax, Peter
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 12 | Number 3 Article 12
1-1-1990
Children Watching Television Advertising: What's
Wrong with This Picture
Peter Hallifax
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter Hallifax, Children Watching Television Advertising: What's Wrong with This Picture, 12 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 495 (1990).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol12/iss3/12
Children Watching Television Advertising:
What's Wrong with this Picture?
by
PETER HALLIFAX*
"Children watch and enjoy commercials long before they are interested in
programs, because commercials are often the best produced and most im-
aginatively conceived moments on TV. "'
Introduction
Today's children watch a great deal of television. In 1985, the aver-
age child between the ages of two and eleven watched approximately four
hours of television per day, or twenty-eight hours per week.2 Those same
children spent almost one-fifth of that viewing time watching
advertisements.'
Since the passage of the Communications Act of 1934,' the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) has monitored the content of both
programming and advertising on television. In 1960, the FCC first iden-
tified children as a specialized audience whose interests should be care-
fully considered by stations and advertisers.5 In 1974, after extensive
research and consultation with parent and consumer groups, the FCC
issued the first set of detailed regulations governing children's television.6
* Third-Year Class, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. FTC STAFF REPORT ON TELEVISION ADVERTISING To CHILDREN 79 (1978) [herein-
after 1978 FTC REPORT], (statement of Joan Ganz Cooney, President, Children's Television
Workshop, and Producer, Sesame Street).
2. Kunkel & Watkins, Evolution of Children's Television Regulatory Policy, 31 J. BROAD-
CASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 367 (1987) (citing the 1986 NIELSEN REPORT ON TELEVI-
SION). It has been calculated that by the time a young person graduates from high school, she
will have watched, on average, 15,000 hours of television compared to only 11,000 hours spent
in classroom instruction. Id.
3. Condry, Bence & Scheibe, Nonprogram Content of Children's Television, 32 J. BROAD-
CASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 255, 265 (1985).
4. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1983).
5. Report and Statement of Policy in re Commission Programming Inquiry, 20 Rad.
Reg. (P & F) 1901 (1960).
6. In re Petition of Action for Children's Television (ACT) for Rulemaking Looking
Toward the Elimination of Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Programming
and the Establishment of a Weekly 14-Hour Quota of Children's Television Programs, Chil-
dren's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 FCC
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Recently, however, the FCC's position has changed radically. Mark
Fowler, appointed FCC Chairman by President Ronald Reagan in 1980,
vowed in his opening address that the government would henceforth be a
spectator rather than a dictator of program content.7 The former Chair-
man has also referred to the FCC as "one of the last of the New Deal
dinosaurs,"' 8 and has consistently argued that the traditional regulatory
function of the Commission is both unproductive and obsolete.9 In keep-
ing with this spirit, the FCC eliminated all quantitative commercial
guidelines for television broadcasting,' ° declaring that "commercial
levels will be effectively regulated by marketplace forces.'
'
For a brief period, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was also
interested in the regulation of children's television, although it concen-
trated its attention on advertising only. Beginning in 1978, the FTC con-
sidered implementation of a series of rules, the most far-reaching of
which was a proposal to ban all televised advertising that would be seen
by an audience composed of a significant portion of children too young to
evaluate it.' 2 After intense and litigious debate, in 1981 the FTC con-
cluded that it should not attempt any regulation of children's television
advertising. 13
The movement for regulating children's television has not lost its
momentum, despite the official non-cooperation of the FCC and FTC.
The most recent battleground was the proposed Children's Television
Advertising Practices Act of 1988,14 which passed both congressional
houses,' 5 but was vetoed by President Reagan after Congress ad-
journed.' 6 The proposed legislation would have required the FCC to re-
Report], recon. denied 55 F.C.C.2d 691 (1975), aff'd sub nom. Action for Children's Televi-
sion v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
7. Address by Mark S. Fowler, FCC Chairman, National Association of Broadcasters
Annual Convention, Las Vegas, Nev. at 5 (April 17, 1985), quoted in O'Brien, The Responsibil-
ity of The Electronic Press to Juvenile Audiences, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 653, 658 (1985).
8. Black, The Deregulatory Revolution, Bus. OF COMM., Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 54.
9. See, e.g., Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach To Broadcast Regulation, 60
TEX. L. REV. 207, 209 (1982).
10. In re The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment
Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Report
and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984).
11. Id. at 1105.
12. 1978 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
13. In re Children's Advertising, FTC Final Staff Report and Recommendation, 43 Fed.
Reg. 17967 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 FTC Final Report].
14. H.R. 3966, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H3979 (daily ed. June 7, 1988).
15. 134 CONG. REC. H4010 (1988); 134 CONG. REC. S16857 (1988).
16. Memorandum of Disapproval for the Children's Television Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1456 (Nov. 5, 1988).
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store regulation of television advertising directed at children, using the
pre-1984 FCC guidelines as a model.' 7
This Note examines the proposed legislation, the rationale for spe-
cific regulations, and the reasons for deregulation in general. It also sug-
gests possible alternatives to FCC involvement that would effectively
protect children from the exploitation of unscrupulous advertisers.
In addition, this Note demonstrates that the most cogent argument
for regulation is that television advertising directed at children is decep-
tive, but that this premise has not been substantiated by its supporters
and has been ignored by those who favor deregulation. Accordingly, the
Note concludes that this issue-whether, and to what extent, television
advertising practices directed at children are deceptive-should be liti-
gated under federal or state deceptive advertising statutes, and that con-




The vetoed Children's Television Advertising Practices Act would
have required the FCC to institute proceedings intended to result in a
specific set of rules governing children's television advertising.'" The
proposed Act also set out minimum standards and objectives.' 9
At the very least, the FCC would be compelled to require licensees
to: (1) limit the percentage of advertising on children's television to 9.5
minutes per hour on weekends and 12 minutes per hour on weekdays; (2)
ensure an adequate separation between program content and commercial
messages;2" and (3) eliminate "host-selling," "tie-ins," and "program-
length commercials."'"
"Host-Selling" is the practice of having the program talent deliver
the commercial pitch.22 A "tie-in" is the linking of the subject of a com-
mercial to a program theme by prominently displaying a brand name
product on the set of a television show. 23 The "program-length commer-
cial" is an attempt by advertisers to avoid the rules mandating a fixed
17. 134 CONG. REC. S955 (1988).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. This distinction is especially problematic for younger children: the FCC suggested
that in order to aid children in identifying commercial messages, the station should announce
the beginning and end of every advertisement, clearly labelling it as such. 1974 FCC Report,
supra note 6, at 15.
21. 134 CONG. REc. S955 (1988).
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id.
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percentage of advertising time to program time. Typically, a commer-
cially available product is used as a central character in a program,
which is often totally funded by the toy distributor. 4
The proposed legislation also addressed the problem of interactive
television shows, 25 the newest trend in children's television. Through
inaudible signals inserted into the transmission, children can interact
with the program if they purchase a special toy capable of picking up the
signals. 6
Legislators clearly identified the reason for the proposed Act: chil-
dren were being victimized by commercialism, which was defeating the
public interest. Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), introducing the
proposed regulations to the Senate, stated unequivocally that increased
commercialism is "keeping quality [children's] programming off the
air. The congressional record demonstrates a high level of outrage
that children are exposed to unnecessary levels of commercialism. The
frequent use of such adjectives as "shameful, .... absurd," "wrong," and.
"disgraceful" in the debate implies an unspoken assumption that in the
most perfect world, children should not be exposed to advertisements at
all. Es
II
Regulatory Jurisdiction of the FCC and FTC
The FCC is authorized to license broadcasters if such a grant would
serve the "public convenience, interest, or necessity,"' 29 and to deny an
application or revoke a license where the licensee has failed to meet this
standard.3" It may also act to prevent the knowing transmission of "false
or deceptive signals or communications."'"
The FTC's jurisdictional base somewhat overlaps that of the FCC,
as the former's statutory obligation is to prescribe "rules and general





26. Charren, Children's Television Advertising: Whose Hand Rocks The Cradle?, 56 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (1988).
27. 134 CONG. REC. S955 (1988).
28. See id. (Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) intoducing the proposed act to the Sen-
ate); 133 CONG. REC. E3585 (1987) (Rep. Terry Bruce (D-Ill.) introducing the proposed bill
into the House of Representatives).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1985).
30. Id. §§ 309(a), 310(b), 312.
31. Id. § 303(m)(1)(D)(1).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 57(a) (1985).
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The FCC generally defers to the FTC in matters of deceptive adver-
tising,33 although it has emphasized that a licensee's compliance with
FTC policy will be part of the review as to whether a licensee has oper-
ated in the "public interest."34 A 1972 Liaison Agreement between the
FCC and the FTC recognizes that, with a few exceptions, the FTC is
primarily responsible for the regulation of unfair or deceptive advertis-
ing, and that the FCC is primarily responsible for ensuring that the over-
all operation of broadcast licensees is consistent with the "public
convenience, interest and neccessity."
35
In sum, then, it is clear that the FTC and FCC have concurrent
jurisdiction to regulate children's television advertising.3 6 If television
advertising directed at children is contrary to the public interest, conven-
ience or neccessity, then the FCC should regulate the advertising. If the
advertising is unfair or deceptive, then the FTC should act. The Liaison
Agreement serves to reinforce the concurrent jurisdiction of both agen-
cies by avoiding conflict between them.
III
Arguments For Regulation
The initial impetus to regulate children's television was the anxiety
generated by the growing level of violence on television programs
watched by children.37 As a result of widespread public unease, Action
for Children's Television (ACT), a public interest group that is still one
of the major players in the controversy, was formed in Boston in the late
1960s. 38
ACT soon realized that the real villain in children's television was
not violence, but commercialization. 39 Thus, since the early 1970s,
ACT's position has been that advertising to young children is "inherently
deceptive."'  ACT claims that children below the age of seven under-
stand neither the nature nor purpose of commercial messages.4 As chil-
dren cannot distinguish advertisements from program content, they are
33. In re Complaint by Consumers Ass'n of D.C. concerning CBS, Inc. and WTOP-TV
alleging False, Misleading or Deceptive Advertising, 32 F.C.C.2d 400, 404, 405 (1971).
34. See In re Complaint of Alan F. Neckritz and Lawrence B. Ordower Concerning Fair-
ness Doctrine in re Stations KGO-TV, KPIX, KNBC and KNXT, 29 F.C.C.2d 807, 810, 814
(1971).
35. Liaison Agreement, Trade Reg. Reg (CCH). 9852 (1972).
36. 1978 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 234.
37. Kunkel & Watkins, supra note 2, at 374.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 373.
40. Charren, supra note 26, at 1252.
41. 1981 FTC Final Report, supra note 13, at 8, 26.
1990]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
clearly being deceived.42 Moreover, ACT argues that even older children
(between the ages of seven and twelve), who can distinguish selling from
entertainment, are being deceived. Children are prone to accept any role
model, and consequently place unwarranted trust in the salesperson.43
Additionally, they are poorly equipped to make informed choices even if
presented with all the relevant information."
Regulating deceptive advertising would benefit not only children,
who would otherwise be confused, but also consumers and sellers. Con-
sumers would benefit because deceptive advertising confuses the market-
place and leads to competition between advertisers that is irrelevant to
quality or price.45 Sellers would benefit because the consumers' confi-
dence in the credibility of the marketplace is reinforced; this credibility is
essential to effective advertising.46
A secondary argument for regulation is the negative effect of chil-
dren's television advertising on the relationship between children and
their parents. When the FCC opened its docket in 1971 for comments on
a proposal to ban all advertising directed to children on television, it re-
ceived over 100,000 letters, ninety percent of which were hostile to adver-
tising. This was the largest volume of mail that the FCC had ever
received on any one subject.47
Advertising is directed toward children, but is effective only if the
children bring pressure on the parents to buy. One advertising executive
put it as follows:
When you sell a woman on a product and she goes to the store and
finds the brand isn't in stock, she'll probably forget about it. But when
you sell a kid on the product, if he can't get it, he will throw himself on
the floor, stamp his feet and cry. You can't get a reaction like that out
of an adult.
4 8
Commentators have noted that this pressure promotes confrontation and
alienation between parents and children, and undermines the parents'
child-rearing responsibilties;49 the parent is constantly compelled to deny
42. Id., pointing out that young children distinguish between commercials and programs
solely on the basis of relative duration.
43. Id. at 21.
44. 1978 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 226.
45. Deception: FTC Oversight: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, 106 (1984).
46. See ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 25, 1982, at 85.
47. Id.
48. 1978 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 93.
49. Id. at 102 (quoting Hearings Before the Senate Select Subcomm. on Nutrition and
Human Needs, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (statement of Sidney Berman, M.D., former presi-
dent of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry)).
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the child access to things that another authority-television-has char-
acterized as accessible and desirable.
50
Advertisers trying to persuade children to want to possess things
have found their task remarkably easy. Parents thus become figures of
repressive authority who must continually frustrate their children's
desires. Regulating the level of commercials at least limits the number of
desires that advertisers can create, and thus allows more time for the





As noted above, the FTC opened its rulemaking proceedings in 1978
with the FTC Staff Report on Television Advertising to Children (the
"1978 FTC Report").5' The FTC terminated the inquiry in 1981 with-
out promulgating any rules, with the FTC Final Staff Report and Recom-
mendation in the Matter of Children's Advertising (the "1981 FTC Final
Report" ).52
Although both reports considered the broad issue of children's tele-
vision advertising in general, they concentrated particularly on the pro-
motion of candy, sugared snacks, and sugared cereals. This narrow focus
can be explained in part by the fact that the arguments in favor of regula-
tion in this area are strengthened by the claim that such products are
harmful to children's health.53
In the 1978 FTC Report, the FTC concluded that televised advertis-
ing of any product to an audience too young to understand the nature of
a commercial message "is inherently . . .deceptive and unfair,"54 thus
accepting the basic argument of ACT. Only three years later, the 1981
FTC Final Report concluded that although television advertising aimed
at children (1) manipulated children into placing indiscriminate trust in
the advertised message; (2) misled children as to the persuasive purpose
of advertising; and (3) used techniques that left children unable to evalu-
ate the information offered in an effective way, it was not neccessarily
deceptive or unfair.55 The FTC terminated its proceedings, noting that
50. Id. at 104.
51. 1978 FTC REPORT, supra note 1.
52. 1981 FTC FINAL REPORT, supra note 13.
53. 1978 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, 47-48.
54. Id. at 157.
55. 1981 FTC Final Report, supra note 13, at 2.
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the only remedy available was a total ban on all television advertising
directed at children, and that such a ban was impractical.56
Backpedalling on its earlier findings, the FTC stated: "Because of
this remedial impediment [sic], there is no need to determine whether or
not advertising directed towards young people is deceptive." ' Without
reaching the "inherently deceptive" argument that it had earlier ac-
cepted, the FTC concluded in 1981 that it could not find a remedy for
the problem for two main reasons: first, a total ban on children's televi-
sion advertising would be impractical; and second, a ban on the advertis-
ing of sugared foods would be impractical.5"
In arguing the case for the impracticability of a total ban, the FTC
relied on a careful division of children into two groups: "young" (aged
two to five) and "old" (aged six through twelve).5 9 The FTC claimed
that only "young" children needed protection, because they lacked the
cognitive awareness to distinguish between commercial pitch and pro-
gram content. 6° Ignoring the argument that "older" children also need
protection because of their limited ability to evaluate advertised informa-
tion, the FTC found that it could not effectively target only program-
ming that would be watched by a substantial audience of "young"
children because so many "older" children also watched the same
programs.
61
Nor could the FTC clearly distinguish between advertisements
aimed at "young" children and those aimed at "older" children. 62 Thus,
implying that "older" children did not need protection from commercials
and indeed had a right to receive advertisements, the FTC found it im-
practical to ban advertisements directed at "young" children without in-
fringing on the viewing rights of the "older" group.
The FTC's second reason for withdrawing from a rulemaking role
addressed the proposed ban on advertising sugared foods. While conced-
ing that sugar played an important part in promoting tooth decay,63 the
FTC concluded that the lack of specific information as to the extent to
which the incidence of dental cavities was affected by particular levels of
sugar in foods made it impractical to regulate the advertisement of sug-
ared foods with sufficient specificity.' 4
56. Id.
57. Id. at 3-4.
58. Id. at 37, 82.
59. Id. at 16 (citing the developmental theories of child psychologist Jean Piaget).
60. Id. at 2, 24, 39.
61. Id. at 37.
62. Id. at 42.
63. Id. at 82.
64. Id. at 85.
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Thus, the FTC used "impracticability" as a reason not to regulate
advertising that, only three years before, it had unequivocally labelled
"inherently both deceptive and unfair."65 More significantly, the FTC
failed to address possible remedies other than a total ban, so that the
many other arguably deceptive practices of advertisers were simply left
unchallenged.66
B. The FCC
The FCC opened its docket on the regulation of children's televi-
sion, including advertising practices, in 197167 at the instigation of ACT.
In 1974, the Commission published its first set of guidelines in the Chil-
dren's Television Report and Policy Statement (the "1974 FCC Re-
port").68 In addition to its mandate under the 1934 Communications
Act to act in the public interest, convenience, and necessity,6 9 the Com-
mission noted that children were a special audience, and that broadcast-
ers had an affirmative duty as trustees of a valuable resource, i.e., the
airwaves, to meet the special interests of the child audience.7 °
The 1974 FCC Report rejected ACT's proposal to ban all advertising
directed at children, arguing that this ban would eliminate funding for
children's programs and thus undermine both the quality and quantity of
children's television. 7' Without establishing its own rules, the Commis-
sion recommended that the industry adhere to the standards of the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters Television Code (the "NAB Code").
72
Noting that the FTC was concurrently considering proposals to deal
with unfair or deceptive advertising and deferring to that body's expertise
and jurisdiction in that area,73 the FCC concluded that it would expect
the industry to follow the NAB Code. The Commission planned further
action if voluntary self-regulation did not work.74
In 1979, the FCC reviewed the situation, finding that self-regulation
had worked because "voluntary" adherence to the NAB code had effec-
tively limited commercial time, had caused stations to separate program
content from commercial message, and had eliminated abusive practices
65. 1978 FTC REPORT, SUPRA note 1, at 157.
66. See Silberstein, Deregulation and Children's Advertising, 1985 ANN. SURVEY OF AM.
L. 603, 605 (1988).
67. In re Children's Television Programs, Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 36 Fed. Reg. 1429 (1971).
68. 1974 FCC Report, supra note 6.
69. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
70. 1974 FCC Report, supra note 6, at 5.
71. Id. at 11.
72. Id. at 13.
73. Id. at 9.
74. Id. at 14.
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such as tie-ins and host-selling.75 However, that same year, the antitrust
division of the Justice Department sued the NAB Code Authority for
violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.76 Because only one provision of
the NAB Code was held to be an illegal restraint of trade,77 ACT re-
quested that the court reinstate those parts of the Code relating to chil-
dren's television advertising. The court refused the request; 78 effectively,
the NAB Code was abandoned.79
Finally, in a 1984 report, which revised programming and commer-
cialization policies and requirements (the "1984 FCC Revision"), the
FCC withdrew all quantitative commercial guidelines for television
broadcasting.8" Explaining that the withdrawal of guidelines included
those affecting children's television, the Commission stated that
"[e]limination of the policy is consistent with the Commission's general
de-emphasis regarding quantitative guidelines engendered in the [1984
FCC Revision]. Moreover, the Commission has consistently noted the
importance of advertising as a support mechanism for the presentation of
children's programming. "81
ACT challenged this withdrawal of guidelines and successfully con-
tended that the FCC had failed to justify the deregulation.82 The court
of appeals remanded the action to the FCC to supply a "reasoned basis"
for its decision.83 Commentators have noted, however, that the court
simply sent the case back to the FCC for a fuller explanation of the rea-
sons for deregulation than the cursory statement that had been provided,
and that rather than a judicial challenge to deregulation of children's
television advertising, the decision is simply a criticism of sloppy FCC
staff work.84
75. Television Programming for Children: A Report of the Children's Television Task
Force, released Nov. 2, 1979, cited in In re Children's Television Programming and Advertis-
ing Practices, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 F.C.C.2d 138, 139 (1979).
76. United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982).
77. Id. at 170.
78. United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 553 F. Supp. 621, 624 (D.D.C. 1982).
79. See Brosterhous, U.S. v. National Association of Broadcasters. The Deregulation of
Self-Regulation, 35 FED. COMM. L.J. 324 (1983).
80. In re the Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment
Requirements and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Report
and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 FCC Revision].
81. In re Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Re-
quirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 103 F.C.C.2d 358, 370-71 (1986).
82. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
83. Id. at 744, 750.
84. Kent, Deregulation Order on Children's Television Advertising Remanded to the FCC,
17 198 N.Y.L.J. 1 (July 24, 1987).
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The FCC has not yet provided a "reasoned basis," as ACT de-
manded,85 to explain why children, who in 1974 were a special audience
whose interests were to be considered by broadcasters as if they were
trustees, are adequately safeguarded by market forces now. However,
the marketplace theory, the abandonment of the trustee model, the in-
creased first amendment rights of broadcasters, and the general political
move toward deregulation 6 are the likely suspects to be marshalled by
the FCC in justifying its actions.
87
C. The Marketplace Theory
The consumer is best served by a system which provides the greatest
free choice in available products and services.88 Although Americans
have generally relied on free markets to provide this range of choice in
their goods and services, they have not allowed these forces to operate
freely in the broadcasting industry. 9 Broadcasting is a business, how-
ever, and consumers (the viewing public) benefit from having the widest
choice possible. 90 Thus the public interest, necessity, and convenience
are best achieved by allowing consumers to choose for themselves, not by
making choices for consumers. 9'
In FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station,92 a station owner pro-
tested that the FCC's decision to license an additional local radio station
in the same area would economically harm his station. The Supreme
Court found that encouraging such economic rivalry, to the detriment of
the complaining station, was within the mandate of the FCC,
commenting:
[T]he field of broadcasting is one of free competition .... The Com-
mission is given no supervisory control of the programs, of business
management or of policy. In short, the broadcasting field is open to
anyone, provided there be an available frequency over which he can
broadcast without interference to others, if he can show his compe-
tency, the adequacy of his equipment, and financial ability to make
good use of the assigned channel.93
In FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild,9 4 decided in 1981, the Supreme
Court expressly sanctioned the FCC's policy of "relying on market forces
85. Action for Children's Television, 821 F.2d at 744.
86. See infra notes 88-131 and accompanying text.
87. See Kunkel & Watkins, supra note 2, at 378.
88. See, e.g., B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 26-31 (1975).
89. See generally Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9.
90. B. OWEN, J. BEEBE & W. MANNING, JR., TELEVISION EcONOMIcs 3 (1974).
91. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 209-10.
92. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
93. Id. at 474-75.
94. 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
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to promote diversity" in entertainment programming,9" and noted that it
was in accord with the 1934 Communication Act's goal of providing "the
maximum benefits of [broadcasting] to all people of the United States."'9 6
In the 1984 FCC Revision, the Commission gave the beneficial effect
of free market regulation as the main reason for the deregulation of tele-
vision advertising:
[W]e find that market incentives will ensure the presentation of pro-
gramming that responds to community needs and provide sufficient
incentive for licensees to become and remain aware of the needs and
problems of their communities. Moreover, we are convinced that these
forces will continue to hold levels of commercialization below our ex-
isting guidelines.
97
The FCC maintained that if stations exceeded the tolerance levels of
viewers by overloading commercial content, then viewers would turn the
dial to another channel.98
The Commission also specifically rescinded its ban on program-
length commercials,9 9 stating only that:
[s]everal commenters specifically noted that the elimination of the
guideline should include elimination of the Commission's ban of pro-
gram-length commercials. o Some suggested that the ability to more
fully inform consumers is in the public interest, whether or not the
information is technically an advertisement. The comments filed by
[one of the commenters] suggested that program length commercials
might help minority-owned stations to obtain a secure revenue base.' 0 1
The implication is that the FCC believes that market forces will effec-
tively regulate program-length commercials. By extrapolation, then, if
program X, a program-length commercial, is more popular than Y, a
typical program, then the public (in this case, children) is demonstrating
its preference and the public interest is therefore served.
The theory of effective regulation by market forces raises an interest-
ing point: commercials are seldom as offensive to children (particularly
young children) as they are to adults. Using the FCC's argument, unless
some other consideration of the "public interest, convenience or neces-
sity" should countervail (such as the "inherent deception of children"
theory), the marketplace approach does allow children to watch what
they want, and the public interest is served. If children choose to watch
commercials, however distasteful this may be to parents, it can still be
95. Id. at 604.
96. Id. at 596.
97. 1984 FCC Revision, supra note 80, at 1077.
98. Id. at 1105.
99. Id. at 1102.




said that the free market forces have given consumers what they want,
and once again the public interest is served.
D. Abandonment of the "Trustee" Theory
The licensing strategem administered by the FCC since the 1934
Communications Act 0 2 was in part a reaction to the "airwave chaos" of
the 1920s.113 In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, "o Justice
Frankfurter approved the scheme: "[t]here is a fixed natural limitation
upon the number of stations that can operate without interfering with
one another."° 5
Over the years, this necessity to choose who would receive a license
led to the public trustee concept."0 6 This concept was reflected in the
1974 FCC Report, which noted that broadcasters, as public trustees of a
scarce and valuable resource, have a duty to "further the educational and
cultural development of America's children ....""'
The scarcity rationale, which justifies the trustee role of the FCC,
has recently been under attack. Modem technology has greatly in-
creased the options available to the viewing public. Furthermore,
although many goods and services available to society are scarce, the sale
and exploitation of these other resources are not regulated by a govern-
ment agency acting as a public trustee.' Ideally, the highest bidder will
make the most efficient use of these resources. Thus, the application of
the trusteeship model is a substantial deviation from the normal alloca-
tion of scarce goods and services in society.' °9
As a practical matter, the scarcity rationale may be merely a historic
remnant; even for a consumer owning only an ordinary VHF television,
the number of stations available currently exceeds the number of daily
newspapers available in large cities." 0 Add UHF television, cable televi-
sion, VCRs, and satellite dish offerings to the viewer's choice and the
scarcity theory of the 1920s becomes nostalgic fantasy rather than mod-
ern reality."'
102. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982).
103. See Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcON. 5 (1959).
104. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
105. Id. at 213.
106. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 399 (1969).
107. 1974 FCC Report, supra note 6, at 5.
108. For example, minerals, luxury cars, and entertainment.
109. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 221.
110. Id. at 225.
Ill. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 770, n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("[T]he opinions of my Brothers Powell and Stevens rightly refrain from relying on the
notion of 'spectrum scarcity' to support their result.").
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E. First Amendment Concerns
In 1974, the FCC addressed and summarily dismissed the first
amendment claims of advertisers." 2 Without detailed discussion, the
1984 FCC Revision cited the first amendment of the United States Con-
stitution as one factor for the Commission's unwillingness to regulate
levels of commercial messages. 113 The FCC noted that since the 1976
landmark case Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., "' commercial speech has "significant First
Amendment protection."' '"
In 1978, the FTC declared that the first amendment would not bar
advertisements of sugared snacks to children." 16 While acknowledging
the Virginia State Board holding, the Commission relied on Ginsberg v.
New York 17 and Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville 8 for the proposition
that the first amendment rights of children are not as broad as those of
adults." 9 In 1981, however, the FTC refused to reaffirm this sanguine
conclusion, simply stating that because the FTC was not going to make
any rules, the question of the constitutionality of such rules was moot. 2 °
Several commentators have argued that the first amendment rights
of broadcasters are a substantial bar to regulating children's television
programming and advertising.' Absent specific case law, however, it is
not clear that the broadening of first amendment rights for both broad-
casting and commercial speech will sufficiently overcome the abridge-
ment of those rights when children constitute the audience.
F. The General Policy Towards Deregulation
Since the 1970s, Congress has steadily decreased governmental regu-
lation of businesses, thereby allowing market forces to operate. 122 This
movement has been generally bipartisan, and deregulation has been ac-
112. 1974 FCC Report, supra note 6, at 10.
113. 1984 FCC Revision, supra note 80, at 1104.
114. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
115. 1984 FCC Revision, supra note 80, at 1104.
116. 1978 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 237.
117. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
118. 422 U.S. 205, 214 (1974).
119. 1978 FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 246.
120. 1981 FTC Final Report, supra note 13, at 4.
121. See, e.g., Versfelt, Constitutional Considerations of the Children's Television Act of
1988. Why the President's Veto Was Warranted, 11 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. 625 (1989);
O'Brien, The Responsibility of the Electronic Press to Juvenile Audiences, 15 Sw. U.L. REV.
653 (1985).
122. P. DIFFENDORFER, Proposed Federal Legislation and the Next Decade of Television,
LAW AND TELEVISION IN THE 80's 237 (1983).
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complished even when both industry management and labor have re-
sisted it. '
23
The 1984 FCC Revision explicitly cited conformity with the Regula-
tory Flexibility Act of 1980124 and the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1980125 as grounds for the FCC's decision to withdraw advertising guide-
lines.' 26 The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires federal agencies to
achieve their statutory goals without causing undue burden to the public,
particularly with regard to the significant economic impact that compli-
ance with regulations would have on small businesses. 27 Rule-making
agencies must publish analyses showing that they have weighed the ne-
cessity for these rules against the economic burden to the regulated en-
tity, and that the rules are the most efficient and least burdensome
required to achieve their statutory ends. 128 While acknowledging that
many local television stations are small businesses, the FCC did not ex-
plain how application of the proposed guidelines restricting children's
television advertising would be economically burdensome to them. In-
stead, the FCC simply invoked "burdensome compliance costs" as a po-
tential problem with the regulation of televised advertising.
129
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 requires that each federal
agency appoint a senior officer to ensure that paperwork, both that gener-
ated within the agency and that required by the agency from regulated
entities, be kept at a minimum. 3° Although the 1984 FCC Revision's
abandonment of logging requirements clearly does eliminate some
paperwork, the Commission did not explain how adherence to advertis-
ing guidelines would affect the volume of paperwork either for the FCC
or for broadcasters. 131
In view of this lack of specificity on the part of the FCC, and more
particularly in view of the passage of the proposed 1988 Children's Tele-
vision Advertising Practices Act through both houses of Congress, 132 it
seems that Congress does not intend its general deregulatory posture to
extend to the provisions of the proposed legislation.
123. Id. at 244-45.
124. 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1980).
125. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (1986).
126. 1984 FCC Revision, supra note 80, at 1080.
127. 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1980).
128. Id. §§ 602-604.
129. 1984 FCC Revision, supra note 80, at 1080.
130. 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (1986).
131. See 1984 FCC Revision, supra note 80, at 1080.




The above analysis outlined the main arguments raised for and
against the regulation of children's television advertising. ACT, other
consumer groups and Congress have identified commercialism as the en-
emy,' 33 whereas the FCC has identified marketplace forces as ultimately
beneficial to both the children's and the public's interest.'34
The deregulators start with the premise that television is a for-profit
business. A merchant, to be successful, must follow the wishes of the
public and provide what is demanded. 135  Unrestricted market forces
will serve the public interest with maximum efficiency.
Applied to children's television, this proposition argues that the ad-
vertiser, to be successful, must sponsor the programs that children most
want to see. For example, if Go-Bots '36 and Sesame Street 137 were aired
simultaneously, the sponsors of Go-Bots could succeed only by producing
a more popular program than Sesame Street. If the child would rather
watch Go-Bots than Sesame Street, it follows that, from the child's point
of view, the marketplace is operating in the child's interest. It is irrele-
vant that the parent might have a different perspective.
In contrast, supporters of regulation claim that the public interest
cannot be served by following only the wishes of the children. Represen-
tative Bruce, introducing the proposed 1988 Children's Television Ad-
vertising Practices Act into the House of Representatives, professed a
general belief that allowing market forces to operate in business was es-
sential to the economy. 3 8 At the same time, he insisted that "[r]elying on
a marketplace of children to determine the course of children's program-
ming is about as wise as allowing a marketplace of children to determine
their courses in school."' 3 9
Two main reasons have been advanced to support the view that reg-
ulations despite the wishes of children are nevertheless in the public in-
terest: first, quality programming cannot be determined by reference to
the children's wishes alone, and second, children's television advertising
is inherently deceptive.' 4 ° The first contention, that quality program-
ming for children should be determined in part by adults, implies an edu-
133. See supra note 26 and text accompanying note 40.
134. See 1984 FCC Revision, supra note 80, at 1080.
135. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 231-33.
136. A popular commercially sponsored children's TV show.
137. A popular governmentally funded children's TV show.
138. 133 CONG. REC. E3585 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987) (statement of Rep. Bruce).
139. Id.
140. Charren, supra note 24, at 1252-53.
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cational approach to television. Peggy Charren, President of ACT, said:
"It's gotten so bad, that if you want to produce a program on the life of
Helen Keller, you first have to talk Mattel into making a Helen Keller
doll."' 41 The implication is that children should learn about the life of
Helen Keller from television, whether or not they want to.
It cannot be seriously doubted that educational television programs,
best exemplified by Sesame Street, are of great benefit to the public.14 2
Studies suggest that children who watch this type of program have im-
proved language and arithmetic skills, and learn socially encouraged
forms of behavior such as tolerance for diverse ethnic groups and posi-
tive attitudes towards school.' 43 This Note, however, is concerned only
with commercial television, where there are no public funds, and there-
fore no motive to educate on the part of the producer. In television, as in
most businesses, altruism is usually unprofitable. Merely limiting the
amount of advertising, and therefore the funds available for children's
programs, will not stimulate educational programs. Rather, this action
would limit the ability of stations to offer children a wide choice of
programming.
The second reason why market forces, while responsive to the de-
mands of children, may yet be contrary to the public interest is the argu-
ment that televised advertising directed at children is inherently
deceptive.'" The sponsors of the proposed 1988 Children's Television
Advertising Practices Act took this position, 45 as does ACT. Since
1974, the FTC and FCC have consistently ignored this argument. 46
This is one argument that is beyond attack. There is no first amend-
ment protection for deceptive, or even misleading advertising. 4 7 The
Supreme Court has observed that "[t]he First Amendment ... does not
prohibit ... insuring that the stream of commercial information flow[s]
cleanly, as well as freely."'' 41 Moreover, it has long been recognized that
deceptive advertising will not be adequately regulated by the market-
place, because the efficiency of marketplace forces depends on the con-
sumer having accurate information. Since the establishment of the
141. Id. at 1258.
142. See Roberson, Mandatory Programming Rules for Children's Television, 3 HASTINGS
COMM/ENT L.J. 701, 703 (1981).
143. Id.
144. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
145. See Remarks of Sen. Tim Wirth (D-Colo.), 134 CONG. REC. S955 (daily ed. Feb. 18,
1988).
146. See supra notes 66 and 85 and accompanying text.
147. Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. 748, 771.
148. Id.




FTC in 1914, it has been evident that a consumer's common-law fraud
remedy is not enough to deter deceptive advertising, and that specific
statutory regulations are necessary to ensure a functional marketplace.' 5
VI
Possible Solutions
Congress may require the FTC or FCC to reinstate regulation of
children's television advertising. However, in light of the demonstrated
unwillingness of both of these bodies to enforce existing rules or to pro-
mulgate new ones, it appears neccessary to look for alternatives. The
obvious sources are federal and state unfair advertising statutes.
In the federal arena, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act' 5 ' provides a
civil remedy to any person who believes that he or she is likely to be
damaged by the use of false description or representation in a commer-
cial transaction.' 52 Although the plain meaning of the Act gives a rem-
edy to anyone "who believes he is likely to be damaged" by deceptive
advertising, the leading case of Colligan v. Activities Club of N. Y, Ltd., '
decided in 1971, restricted the right to sue to injured business competi-
tors. 5 4 More recently, however, this restriction has been somewhat
eroded. 55 Currently, the plaintiff need only be economically damaged
by the deceptive advertising. 156 However, standing to sue is still reserved
to the class of "commercial plaintiffs," a category that does not yet in-
clude consumers. 157
Commentators have seen the expansion of section 43(a) as a promis-
ing development for potential litigants, replacing the void left by govern-
mental deregulation.' 58 This view is supported by dicta in recent
decisions critical of the Colligan rule,' 59 but currently the non-commer-
cial consumer has no standing to sue under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. 160
Another possible solution is state unfair advertising statutes. For
example, California Business and Professions Code section 17500 forbids
150. Id. at 546-47.
151. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
153. 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
154. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1951).
155. Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1984); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d
602 (9th Cir. 1981).
156. Id.
157. See Keller, Private Regulation of Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
1985 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 563, 571.
158. See Kotler, And Now for This Commercial Brake, 5 CAL. LAW. 29, 31 (1985).
159. See, e.g., Thorn, 736 F.2d at 932.
160. Keller, supra note 157, at 571.
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any seller of goods or services from using any advertising device which is
misleading. '6
In Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods
Corp., 62 the California Supreme Court held that any member of the
public could sue an advertiser under section 17500, and required only a
showing that "members of the public are likely to be deceived ... [and
that] [a]llegations of actual deception, reasonable reliance, and damage
are unnecessary."' 63 One of the advertiser's defenses in that case, which
involved the children's advertising of sugared breakfast cereals, was that
although the children may be deceived, it is the parents who buy the
product. The court rejected this argument, concluding that "it should be
sufficient that defendant makes a misrepresentation to one group in-
tending to influence behavior of the ultimate purchaser."'
At first blush, it seems that advertising directed at children too
young to recognize that they are watching a commercial pitch is "a mis-
representation to one group intended to influence the ultimate pur-
chaser." Also clearly within the ambit of the statute are advertisements
that falsely represent the function or benefit of the product. More prob-
lematic, however, is the fate of the program-length commercial. If it is
directed at children who are old enough to know that they are watching
a commercial pitch, and if there is no deception as to what is being adver-
tised, then no misrepresentation would be involved.
There have been no reported decisions involving television advertis-
ing directed at children since General Foods, but the strong commitment
to consumer protection demonstrated in that case suggests further litiga-
tion between consumers and advertisers is forthcoming.
VII
Conclusion
ACT and other proponents of regulating children's television adver-
tising have failed to convince the FTC or FCC of their thesis that such
advertising is inherently deceptive or unfair to children. The FTC has
declined to regulate because it would be impractical, while the FCC
maintains that marketplace forces will deal with the problem and will act
in the children's best interests. Both these arguments sidestep ACT's
proposition.
161. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (Deering 1979).
162. 35 Cal. 3d 197, 197 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1983).
163. Id. at 211, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
164. Id. at 219, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
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Congressional supporters of regulation have explicitly adopted
ACT's argument, without giving reasons.'65 Thus, if a subsequent ver-
sion of the unsuccessful 1988 Children's Television Advertising Practices
Act were to be successfully enacted, the argument would be conclusorily
decided in favor of ACT.
Children are notoriously dissatisfied by conclusory reasoning. If a
parent says, "You can't have that; it's bad for you," the child will inevi-
tably reply, "Why?" If the parent then says, "Because you're being
duped," the child will typically answer, "How?" At this point in the
dialogue, Congress, acting as national nanny, is prepared to conclude,
"Because we say so." Applying this analogy to the subject at hand, the
best solution is to litigate the issue of deceptive advertising. Although
many state statutes allow consumers to sue advertisers for deceptive ad-
vertising, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not.
Another reason to address the deception theory in depth is that it
will allow the remedy to be tailored to the problem. If all television ad-
vertising directed at children is found to be inherently deceptive, then it
makes more sense to impose a total ban, rather than merely limit the
amount of commercial time. The congressionally approved regulations,
in this sense, contain an uneasy paradox; if, as stated, television advertis-
ing directed at children is inherently deceptive, why allow children to
watch it a given percentage of the time? Why not ban it completely?
Accepting it as a necessary evil may seem practical, but to admit that
some deception of children is necessary to the existence of children's pro-
gramming is at best embarrassing, at worst cynical. If it is decided that
not all television advertising is deceptive, but only certain practices, then
these practices can be enjoined.
Broadcasters have offered the argument that viewing advertisements
helps children prepare for their future lives as consumers. Though this
argument seems somewhat Orwellian, it is worth noting that children
exposed to large amounts of television advertising do develop a healthy
cynicism for the commercial message.' 66 If the public does not care
enough to pay for the kind of programs that they want children to watch,
and if the content of commercial television is not deceptive within the
definition of federal or state deceptive advertising statutes, then children
should be allowed to watch what they want.
It is not enough to regulate children's television advertising simply
because it is distasteful, but it is clearly necessary to ban advertising that
is deceptive. Because federal and state statutes, and related case law,
165. See supra text accompanying note 145.
166. Bever, Smith & Johnston, Young Viewers Troubling Responses to Television Advertise-
ments, 1985 HARV. Bus. REV. 109 (1985).
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have established definitions of deceptive advertising, the courts are the
proper fora to determine precisely which practices in children's television
are deceptive, and why. Congress should not preempt this important de-
bate by summarily enacting regulations.

